Approved For Release 2006/01/03: CIA-RDP87B01034R000500140089-9 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS WORKING GROUP

SECOM-D-137

15 May 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Acting Chairman, DCI Security Committee	
FROM:		STAT
	Investigative Standards Working Group	

1. DCID 1/14 specifies minimum personnel security standards and procedures governing eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). In September 1980, the DCI Security Committee tasked the Investigative Standards Working Group to review DCID 1/14 for possible revision. I am pleased to report that the Working Group has completed its review.

Revision of DCID 1/14

SUBJECT:

- 2. The Working Group deliberated at length on ways to enhance the SCI personnel security program within the DCI Intelligence Community. Although a number of minor suggestions for changes were considered, early agreement was reached within the Working Group that, while DCID 1/14 could be clarified in some specific areas, this directive should be left essentially intact with one critical exception. That exception concerns use of the polygraph as a requirement in screening for initial and continued SCI access.
- 3. Based on results of a 1980 Working Group Study and the successful experience of two member agencies, the Working Group believes that the overwhelming effectiveness of the polygraph in personnel security screening makes its use for SCI access imperative. Implementation of the Working Group proposal will produce at least three major benefits for the U.S. Government:

 (1) Use of the polygraph will greatly enhance the quality of security assurance and reduce the risk as opposed to current investigative efforts alone. (2) Its use will sharply reduce the number of unauthorized disclosures of classified information

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through early identification and overall deterrence. (3) Its use will permit large numbers of military and Government employees (including industrial contractor employees) to be utilized productively in SCI programs almost immediately. The third point alone will eliminate the currently burgeoning cost of investigative effort and drastically reduce nonproductive and very expensive waiting time costs.

- 4. On 6 May 1981, after several months of deliberation, the Working Group voted 12 to 1 to propose revision of DCID 1/14 as shown in Attachment 1. Representatives of the following organizations voted in favor of the revision: Air Force, Army, CIA, DIA, DOE, FBI, Justice, NSA, Navy, SAF/SS, State, and Treasury. The Commerce Department observer also asked that he be recorded as voting in favor of the proposal. The OSD representative voted against the proposal and stated that his dissent was based on his total opposition to any use of the polygraph in screening for initial or continued SCI access.
- 5. An explanation of each recommended change to DCID 1/14 is contained in Attachment 2. A statement of factors bearing on the issues, including the resource impact, is presented in Attachment 3.
- 6. It is recommended that the DCI Security Committee concur with the Working Group's proposals and submit the revised DCID 1/14 to the Director of Central Intelligence for his approval and promulgation. It is also recommended that, with members consenting, the Acting Chairman of the DCI Security Committee appoint a working panel of Intelligence Community representatives on the Federal Interagency Polygraph Committee to prepare operating guidelines for the standards, policies and procedures outlined in Paragraph 2 of Annex C, DCID 1/14 (see Attachment 1).

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Attachments